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HUMBLE CONNEXIVITY
Abstract. In this paper, I review the motivation of connexive and strongly
connexive logics, and I investigate the question why it is so hard to achieve
those properties in a logic with a well motivated semantic theory. My answer
is that strong connexivity, and even just weak connexivity, is too stringent a
requirement. I introduce the notion of humble connexivity, which in essence
is the idea to restrict the connexive requirements to possible antecedents.
I show that this restriction can be well motivated, while it still leaves us
with a set of requirements that are far from trivial. In fact, formalizing the
idea of humble connexivity is not as straightforward as one might expect,
and I offer three different proposals. I examine some well known logics to
determine whether they are humbly connexive or not, and I end with a more
wide-focused view on the logical landscape seen through the lens of humble
connexivity.
Keywords: connexive logic; strong connexivity; unsatisfiability; paraconsis-
tency; conditional logic; modal logic
1. Introduction
This paper is an attempt to answer a particular challenge to the en-
terprise of connexive logic. It was put to me some years ago by David
Makinson.1
1 Not only is he, by giving me this challenge, responsible for the existence of
this paper, he also gave a number of suggestions that were of tremendous help to
me in writing this paper; section 6 in particular owes its inclusion and form to these
suggestions. Two others have had an equally great impact on this paper, and they
happen to be the editors of this volume. The idea of humble connexivity originates
in my joint work with Hitoshi Omori. Even if what I’ll have to say is probably
more opinionated than he would have put it, I would not have been able to form
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He said (quoted from dim memory, but corroborated by his own
memory of the event):
I think that the idea of connexive logic leads up a blind alley. The
connexive principles look convincing at first glance, but just a little
thought will show that these are only appearances. For example, in
(A → ¬A), take A to be an outright contradiction such as B∧¬B, and
the statement will look perfectly fine.
That day, I had little to answer. Now, however, I think I have the
answer that I should have given back then. Sometimes you wake up
realizing which witty and pithy reply you should have given the day
before. Other times, it takes some years, and the reply is not pithy at
all but paper length. In any case, here it is.
2. Background: Connexivity, Weak and Strong
Let us start at the beginning. Usually, connexivity is understood to lie
in adherence to the following principles:
Aristotle ¬(A → ¬A) and ¬(¬A → A) are valid.
Boethius (A → B) → ¬(A → ¬B) and (A → ¬B) → ¬(A → B)
are valid.2
As it happens, few of the known logics are actually connexive. Most
prominently, classical logic is not connexive. Moreover, classical logic
would even become trivial if Aristotle and Boethius were added as
new axioms, so in a connexive logic, certain classical validities will have
to be dropped. Though non-classical logics are, for the most part, arrived
at by dropping certain things from classical logic, few if any of the usual
non-classical ideas lead naturally to something that is connexive.
these opinions without him. Heinrich Wansing has long been my guide to all things
connexive (and not just mine), and he has given me a detailed list of comments that
much improved this piece. Two referees have also given very helpful comments, and
some improvements are due to observations by Hannes Leitgeb and Lavinia Picollo
and the audience at the Third Connexive Logic Workshop in Kyoto in 2017. I thank
them all, and remain responsible for all mistakes and opinions expressed.
2 Nothing I have to say hinges on the difference between ¬(A → ¬A) and ¬(¬A →
A), nor on the difference between (A → B) → ¬(A → ¬B) and (A → ¬B) → ¬(A →
B), and I will often just discuss one of these variations and leave the others to be
understood implicitly. Sometimes, when I take a thought to apply in obviously similar
ways to both Aristotle and Boethius, I will even just mention ¬(A → ¬A) and
ask the reader to think of all four principles.
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Before I try to give a diagnosis of why this is so, a quick note on
the names of the connexive theses is in order: The intent of my paper
is conceptual, not historical. That is, I do not consider the question
what Aristotle and Boethius thought, and whether it is captured by the
principles named after them. However, the interested reader should con-
sider this piece side by side with Wolfgang Lenzen’s contribution to this
collection, as he argues that the charitable way of reading these authors
is to take them to mean something very close to what I will develop here.3
For the purposes of this paper, let us start with the observation that
these principles certainly seem plausible at first blush. Read out with
the usual natural language correspondences to the formal vocabulary, it
is hard not to feel a strong pre-theoretic intuition that these principles
express logical truths. “It is not the case that if A is the case, not-A is
the case”, for example, is as plausibly true as it is clumsy phrased. The
same is true if we transpose the conditional to the subjunctive mood:
“It is not the case that if A were the case, not-A would be the case”.
Though I have come to think that the connexive theses are most
interesting when thought about as natural language conditionals, it re-
mains true that they also sound intuitively right when → is read as
entailment or implication: “It is not the case that a statement should
entail its own negation”. Plausible, indeed, at least at first sight.
In earlier work, I have pointed out that Aristotle and Boethius
by themselves might not be doing full justice to these intuitions. In [3],
I suggested that in order to do so, a logic should additionally satisfy the
following conditions:4
Unsat1 In no model, A → ¬A is satisfiable (for any A).
Unsat2 In no model (A → B) and (A → ¬B) are simultaneously satis-
fiable (for any A and B).
It seemed, and still seems, to me that whatever reason you might
have to require “It is not the case that if A is the case, not-A is the
3 Our papers were developed in complete isolation, and we only found out about
their surprising convergence when we were both invited to give talks at the Third
Connexive Logic Workshop in Kyoto in 2017. The paper submitted to this issue
by Wansing and Unterhuber, “Connexive Conditional Logic. Part 1”, also has some
overlap with my topic, especially with the material in section 7. Furthermore, the
editors have pointed out to me that [15] also expresses ideas that go in a similar
direction as the notion of humble connexivity does.
4 Again, remember that variations like ¬A → A are omitted in all clauses that
follow and are to be understood implicitly.
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case” to be logically true should also rule out any satisfiable instance
of “If A is the case, not-A is the case”. Note that this was not just an
idle exercise in pedantry, as there were connexive logics discussed in
the literature that had satisfiable instances of A → ¬A, etc. I coined
the term strong connexivity for the property that is made up of all four
conditions above (Aristotle, Boethius, Unsat1 and Unsat2). Cor-
respondingly, I called logics that only satisfy the earlier two conditions
weakly connexive.5
More recently, [2], Luis Estrada-González and Elisángela Ramírez-
Cámara found it useful to single out the last two conditions, Unsat1
and Unsat2, and called logics satisfying those conditions (but not nec-
essarily Aristotle and Boethius) Kapsner-strongly connexive. I felt
both flattered and bemused by this development, as I had certainly not
intended to make any case for those conditions by themselves. I have
warmed up to the idea that they might have some merit in certain set-
tings, though, and I will write a bit more about this below.
While I am still not completely certain that Unsat1 and Unsat2
are worth investigating on their own in this way, I have surely not come
to doubt my argument for adding them to the connexive theses Aristo-
tle and Boethius. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that strong
connexivity seems to be a very demanding requirement. Even though
connexive logic, as a research field, is living through a small renaissance
these days,6 there have been no proposals for a truly satisfying strongly
connexive logic since the idea was introduced, at least none that I am
aware of. What I mean by “truly satisfying” in this context is mainly
that the logic should have an intelligible and well-motivated semantics.
There are strongly connexive logics, but they tend to be many-valued
logics in which an intuitive reading of the values is missing.7 In my
view, this amounts to considerable (even if clearly defeasible) evidence
5 Note that any weakly connexive system will have to be paraconsistent, else it
will collapse into triviality. It might be thought that certain applications of paraconsis-
tent logics will also make it doubtful whether the Unsat-clauses are really warranted.
I will come back to this and other topics related to paraconsistency towards the end
of the paper.
6 See, e.g., references in [17, 18], as well as the contributionis to the present
volume.
7 With Hitoshi Omori, I myself have been working on ideas that have gotten us
closer to strong connexivity than any other attempt we know of in a logic that is a
close relative to the one we introduced in [5]. In the end, we must admit to still fall
slightly short of the pure idea of strong connexivity, but our efforts are interesting in
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that strong connexivity was too much to ask for. And indeed, I have
come to believe that this is the case.
It therefore looks to me that, starting out from strong connexivity,
we might have to weaken our requirements again. There are (at least)
three options here:
(A) We go back to weak connexivity and look for ways in which
the original motivation of strong connexivity was mistaken. Maybe the
kinds of instances of A → ¬A etc. that are satisfiable all have some
interesting property that makes their satisfiability plausible (while it
does not undermine the plausibility of the logical truth of ¬(A → ¬A)
etc.) Someone generally sympathetic to paraconsistent logics might have
a story to tell along these lines.8 I am suspicious of the viability of this
route, but I am ready to be convinced otherwise.
(B) We could go the other way and consider the validity of Aris-
totle and Boethius as relatively unimportant compared to Unsat1
and Unsat2. That is, we could instead go on to look for Kapsner-
strong connexive logics as the true solution to the intuitions driving the
connexive enterprise. Until recently, this would have seemed a rather
absurd option to me, but as I mentioned above, I am in the process of
changing my mind. At this point I believe that there might be a place for
Kapsner-strongly connexive logics in a full picture, but I will not pursue
the line in this piece.9
(C) The last option is the one I want to investigate in this paper:
I want to weaken the requirements of strong connexivity in a quite dif-
themselves, and they also spawned the ideas in this piece. That work will be published
elsewhere, but I will allow myself to allude to it again below.
8 Again, a logic that is only weakly connexive will have to be paraconsistent in
order to avoid triviality.
9 As there will be a small point of contact with the material below, let me give
just a very small glimpse of what I have in mind. I am at the moment exploring
the idea that connexivity is fully at home in the realm of counterfactual conditionals,
while in indicative conditionals the plausibility of Aristotle and Boethius is a
matter of pragmatics rather than semantics. In particular, these principles strike us
as plausible because a presupposition fails when things like “If A is the case, then
not-A is the case” are asserted, namely the presupposition that the antecedent of
an indicative conditional is an epistemic possibility for the speaker (see [6]). If one
takes a Strawsonian view on presupposition failures, according to which they lead to
statements that lack a truth value and whose negations also lack a truth value, one
will feel encouraged to look for something like Kapsner-strongly connexive systems
(possibly slightly altered by the ideas which I develop in this piece below), at least in
order to deal with indicatives.
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ferent dimension from the line between strong and weak connexivity.
I will introduce this new line of demarcation in the next section.
3. Humble Connexivity
As I already mentioned in footnote 7, the idea to this new line of demar-
cation came to me as I was working with Hitoshi Omori on a new family
of constructive logics that we augmented with a subjunctive conditional.
Omori and I realized that often, the problematic part of getting strong
connexivity seems to be wrestling with impossible antecedents. This
suggested the following: Impossible antecedents are generating too much
trouble, so what we should go for is a weaker notion of connexivity that
only applies to possible antecedents, or at least non-contradictory ones.
We should stick to requiring Aristotle, Boethius and the two Unsat-
clauses to hold, but only if the antecedents are possible. I will call this
more restrained idea of connexivity humble connexivity, and I will get to
how to make this idea formally more precise in the next sections. In this
section, I want to make the notion informally plausible, first.
Before I get to my arguments to that end, just a quick note on the
terminology I adopted: Hypothetically, someone persuaded by these ar-
guments, but not by my earlier arguments for strong connexivity, might
want to disregard the unsatisfiability clauses, even in their humbled form.
For the sake of completeness, then, we might want to call this impover-
ished set of requirements weak humble connexivity and the full set strong
humble connexivity. For ease of communication, though, I will here refer
to the latter simply as humble connexivity, just because I believe it to
express the right requirements.
Now, what speaks for humble connexivity is not just that it might
simply be easier to meet that lowered bar, as opposed to the earlier re-
quirements of strong connexivity. I believe that it is also philosophically
a most natural move, all considerations of technical feasibility aside.
There are two ways to argue for humble connexivity, and, as far
as I can see, only one to argue against it, all of them starting with
different answers to the question what we should do with conditionals
with impossible antecedents:
First, we might say that conditionals with impossible antecedents
are pretty much opaque to our intuitions. If something impossible were
the case, then who knows what else would be the case? Everything?
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Nothing? Something? All of these answers have been given, and it
might be doubted that this dispute can be resolved at all. In view of
this, it would seem prudent to only ask for humble connexivity, just to be
sure that we aren’t overplaying our hand by asking for too much. Taking
this agnostic stance will not mean that we will be disappointed by a non-
humbly connexive logic, only that we will be satisfied with a humble one.
The second, more full-blooded answer would be the one I was given
by David Makinson: We indeed have a good idea about statements of
the form (A → ¬A) when A is impossible: They are true!
Certainly, if the impossibility of the antecedent stems from it being
contradictory, there is a very strong case for this answer to be made. One
might, for example, think it is right because one believes in Explosion,
which will get us there immediately. Explosion, of course, is a con-
tested principle, so it is worthwhile to note that much less questionable
principles are sufficient as well. This has been clear at least since Storrs
McCall made his contribution to Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment;
here is his derivation ([9, p. 463] notation adjusted):
1. (A ∧ ¬A)→ A
2. A → (¬A ∨A)
3. (A ∧ ¬A)→ (¬A ∨A)
4. ((A ∧ ¬A)→ ¬(A ∧ ¬A))
The last step packs together a DeMorgan law and double negation elim-
ination. The latter of which might have intuitionists grumble a bit, so
it might be worthwhile to point out that it isn’t strictly needed, as the
following adjustment of the derivation shows:
1. (A ∧ ¬A)→ ¬A
2. ¬A → (¬A ∨ ¬¬A)
3. (A ∧ ¬A)→ (¬A ∨ ¬¬A)
4. ((A ∧ ¬A)→ ¬(A ∧ ¬A))
This uses only principles endorsed by adherents of almost all major non-
classical logics (note that the DeMorgan law is one of the three that
intuitionists accept).10
10 As I was looking this part of McCall’s contribution to Entailment up, I was
startled to find a line of thought that seems very close to the one in this paper. McCall
is thinking of a calculus for “events or states of affairs that occur at the same time” and
wants to restrict substitutivity in such a way that you cannot get from (A ∧ B) → A
to (A ∧ ¬A) → A, because A and ¬A just cannot be occurring at the same time.
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In any case, whether because of these derivations or some other rea-
son, if you believe that (A → ¬A) is true when A is contradictory or
otherwise impossible, you should certainly welcome the restriction to
possible antecedents in the humble requirements.
Both of the views explored so far, then, point us towards humble
connexivity. Those who will insist on taking the third remaining option
at this point, namely to argue that we can be sure that (A → ¬A) is
false11 even if A is contradictory, will have to carry on in their search
for a non-humble strongly connexive logic. If they strike gold, we will be
satisfied as well, as any strongly connexive logic will trivially satisfy the
demands of humble connexivity. But even if such a success is to be had
(something I am by now mildly doubtful of), there is value in discussing
our restriction, because it will make connexivity an interesting topic for
all those who hold one of the two other views about such statements.
As I said above, I think that giving one of the first two answers
seems plausible for a range of notions of (im)possibility. Certainly, this
is true for logical possibility, in the sense that the antecedent should not
be outright contradictory; for the purposes of this paper, it might well
be enough to stop right there. But intuitively, probably also slightly
less blatant forms of impossibility should be filtered out. Mathematical
impossibility looks like it might well have to go, and maybe the same
goes for metaphysical impossibility.12
4. Is Humble Connexivity Boring?
For the reasons above, I believe that philosophically, humble connexivity
is more attractive than “traditional” unrestricted connexivity, both in its
weak and its strong form. It is also more attractive than having no kind
Given such a restriction, calling for connexivity will come to the same thing as calling
for humble connexivity (modulo the addition of the idea of strong connexivity, which
I don’t think is in conflict with the ideas McCall was trying to spell out). However, I
want to apply my idea to all logics, whether or not substitutivity holds in them.
11 Or a least not true, while ¬(A → ¬A) is true.
12 Maybe even epistemic impossibility might be something to consider here: An
alternative way to account for the unacceptability of Aristotle and Boethius in
the indicative mood which I mentioned in footnote 9 would be not to view it as a
question of pragmatics and to make it into a semantic requirement that would look
just as the above, with the diamond expressing that the statement is possibly true for
all the speaker knows.
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of connexivity at all, at least for those who are moved by the intuitions
alluded to in the beginning of this piece. Also, I have conjectured that
given this restriction, it will be possible to finally find some more satisfy-
ing logics that meet our demands, and I will give some evidence for that
conjecture right below. All that is good. Is there anything that might
possibly be bad about the requirements of humble connexivity?
One of the few ways I can think of to be unsatisfied with humble
connexivity is to think that it is utterly obvious and boring.13 The beef
of connexivity, that argument might run, lies precisely in those things
that I want to filter out, namely the contradictory premises. Of course,
whether those instances of Aristotle and Boethius with inconsistent
premises should be valid or not is a contentious question, but that is the
reason why connexive logic is bold and exciting. When we dial back to
humble connexivity, then what we are left with is something on which a
consensus might indeed quickly be reached, but that just goes to show
how the really interesting questions have been skirted.
That line of thought, however, runs into a big problem: The proposal
can’t be quite that boring and obvious, given that so many of our garden-
variety logics fail to live up to it! First and foremost, classical logic is not
humbly connexive. In classical logic, A → ¬A is true when A is false,
no matter A’s logical or modal status. Similarly, in intuitionistic logic
A → ¬A is provable when ¬A is provable. The same goes for Nelson
logics N3 and N4, as well as all the variations I introduced in [4].
Indeed, I have only found two related areas in non-classical logic in
which humble connexivity seems to arise naturally. These are modal log-
ics with strict implications and the so-called conditional logics, i.e. logics
designed to account for counterfactual conditionals. However, before I
can make the argument that these logics fulfill my requirements, I will
need to express them in a formally more adequate way.
5. Expressing Humble Connexivity: Modal and Plain
Expressing humility can be difficult. “I am so humble!”, for example,
rarely works.
It turns out that in our case, the task is likewise not quite as straight-
forward as one might hope, and that some attention needs to be paid
13 I have actually heard that complaint when I first aired the idea.
522 Andreas Kapsner
to the particular circumstances. I will propose two ways of formalizing
humble connexivity in this section and leave a third one, applicable in
paraconsistent settings, for a later section.
First, in those cases in which we have suitable modal vocabulary
available it seems only natural to employ it to express the restriction
to possible statements as antecedents. In the case of Boethius, this
concerns not just A, but also (A → B), because we are driven by the
recognition that unsatisfiable antecedents are generating too much trou-
ble, and (A → B) happens to be the antecedent of the main connective
in Boethius. This leads to the following proposal for what I call modal
humble connexivity:
Modal Humble Aristotle: ♦A |= ¬(A → ¬A) is valid.
Modal Humble Boethius:
♦A ∧ ♦(A → B) |= (A → B)→ ¬(A → ¬B) is valid
Modal Humble Unsat1: In no model, ♦A ∧ (A → ¬A) is satisfiable.
Modal Humble Unsat2: In no model, ♦A ∧ (A → B) ∧ (A → ¬B) is
satisfiable.
I think that this way of phrasing the requirements is relatively straight-
forward, even if there might be alternatives that could also be considered
(such as |= ♦A → ¬(A → ¬A), etc.). What seems more in need of
discussion is the talk of the availability of “suitable modal vocabulary”
that I used in the lead-up to the conditions. However, I am afraid that
seeing whether that proviso is met will involve some reader discretion.
As we are absolutely general about other features of the logics in ques-
tion, it seems hard to give a precise set of syntactic requirements for
this modality; it will have to be seen in each individual case whether the
diamond does what we want it to do. Also, as I think many levels of
impossibility might be affected by the arguments for humble connexivity
in the preceding section, I intend to remain somewhat uncommitted as
to which kind of possibility the diamond should express. I will come
back to this issue below.
In any case, I want the idea of humble connexivity to be general
enough to be also applicable to logics which don’t have modal vocabulary,
so I would like to suggest a second set of conditions in which I will use
unsatisfiability as a rough proxy for impossibility.14
14 I am, after all, already in the slightly unusual business of talking about unsatis-
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What this will mean in detail is that we will ask for Aristotle
only to hold for those A that are satisfiable. Likewise, Unsat1 is only
required to hold when A is satisfiable.
When we consider Boethius, we will again have to ask for a satisfi-
able A and to make sure that (A → B) is satisfiable.15
Thus, what we get is the following set of conditions, which charac-
terizes what I shall call plain humble connexivity.
Plain Humble Aristotle: For any satisfiable A , ¬(A → ¬A) is valid.
Plain Humble Boethius: For any satisfiable A and satisfiable
(A → B) , (A → B)→ ¬(A → ¬B) is valid.
Plain Humble Unsat1: In no model, A → ¬A is satisfiable
(for any satisfiable A).
Plain Humble Unsat2: In no model, (A → B) and (A → ¬B) are
simultaneously satisfiable (for any satisfiable A).
Unfortunately, the two ways of phrasing the requirements of humility
are only approximations of each other. In certain circumstances, plain
and modal humble connexivity might diverge, while they will go together
in other settings. We will see both of these patterns when we look at
the two examples of humbly connexive logics I mentioned earlier, modal
logics with strict implications and conditional logics. These families of
intensional logics are close relatives of each other, and it is interesting to
study how they respond to the two different versions of humble connexiv-
ity I introduced in this section. After this, I will get back to the question
which version of the clauses should be used in questionable cases.
6. Humble Connexivity in Modal Logics with Strict Implication
First, consider normal modal logics, such as K or stronger ones like
T, B, S4, S5 and others. When we define a strict implication, J, as
fiability in phrasing my requirements, as I want to take the ideas of strong connexivity
on board.
15 It might look like it would be enough to ask for the satisfiablity of B to achieve
this in any decent logic, but that is not quite true. Just take B to be ¬A, and then
any logic that satisfies Unsat1 (for satisfiable A) will yield an unsatisfiabile antecedent
here. To ask that A and B should be simultaneously satisfiable should do the trick
in most settings and be somewhat more elegant. However, just to be explicit about
what I want and to guard against unforeseen complications, I go for the slightly more
unwieldy but more straightforward condition that (A → B) is satisfiable.
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(A ⊃ B) in these logics, where ⊃ is the material conditional, then
we get systems that exhibit Modal Humble Connexivity. For example,
Modal Humble Aristotle, ♦A |= ¬(A J ¬A), unfolds in this setting
to be a definitional abbreviation of ♦A |= ¬(A ⊃ ¬A).
In the Kripke semantics for K (the logic characterized by the class of
all frames) and all stronger systems, ♦A being true at a world w means
that there is a world accessible from w in which A is true. In classical
logic, (A ⊃ ¬A) is equivalent to ¬A. Thus, (A ⊃ ¬A) says nothing
more than that in every world accessible from w, ¬A is true. Given
the underlying classical logic governing the worlds, this cannot be true
in w (delivering Modal Humble Unsat1), so ¬(A ⊃ ¬A) must be
true in w, which gives us Modal Humble Aristotle. It is not harder
than this to see that Modal Humble Boethius and Modal Humble
Unsat2 hold, as well.
However, the normal modal logics do not answer to the non-modal-
ized version of the clauses. To see this, just consider a model, call it
M , in which a given propositional parameter, call it p, is false at every
world. This is a perfectly normal model. As p is arbitrarily chosen, it
is surely satisfiable; a different model in which it appears true at some
worlds is just as fine as the one we are considering. Nonetheless, we
find in M that (p ⊃ ¬p) holds. Thus, p J ¬p is satisfiable, and the
non-modalized version of the clauses is seen to fail to hold. (M is not a
countermodel for the modalized version of humility because ⋄p does not
hold in it).
We could try to get these modal logics to also answer to the unmodal-
ized version of the requirements by restricting the class of models in such
a way that such troublesome models as M are ruled out. That is, we
might, instead of arbitrary models, only consider “intended” models that
seek to capture logical possibility. One requirement for being among the
intended models would be that for each world and each propositional
parameter, there is an accessible world in which that parameter is true,
and another world in which it is false.
This would not be a wholly unnatural move. It is relatively close to
what Carnap originally proposed in Meaning and Necessity ([1], see also
[8]), and we will see a variant of it in the next section. However, in the
case of modal logic, Timothy Williamson has argued that it would be
going against the spirit of Kripke’s project to make this kind of restriction
to intended models. He concludes that therefore, possible worlds seman-
tics are not very well suited for the study of logical necessity and more apt
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to give us insights about metaphysical and other kinds of necessity (see
[20, p. 83]). This is not the place to delve into that argument. However,
whether or not we agree with Williamson, we must acknowledge the fact
that in practice, the strategy of singling out intended models is usually
not pursued in the study of modal logics and strict implications.
So, unless we want to go against the grain of current theorizing about
modal logic, we must come to terms with the fact that the two versions of
the humble requirements part ways at this point. Maybe the best simple
heuristic I can offer is to use the modal version whenever a diamond
expressing a notion of possibility that strikes you as affected by the
arguments above is available, and to revert to the plain version only
when such expressibility is not available. In any case, we will see in the
next section that (luckily) there are also cases in which no such call needs
to be made, as the two versions coincide.
7. Humble Connexivity in Conditional Logics
The second area in which humble connexivity seems to be easily attain-
able are the logics for counterfactual conditionals (such as “If A had been
the case, then B would have been the case”) developed by Robert Stal-
naker and David Lewis, and the many people working in their wake.16
There is a difference between Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s systems that plays
a certain role here; I will discuss Stalnaker’s system as introduced in [14]
in this section and comment on Lewis’s in an appendix for the interested
reader.
The account of counterfactuals that Stalnaker and Lewis give is some-
times called one of “variably strict” conditionals, which already shows
the close proximity to the strict conditionals we saw in the last section.
Accordingly, the semantics is a variation of the possible world semantics
for modal logics that was discussed in the last section. The intuitive idea
behind Stalnaker’s logic is that a conditional statement in the subjunc-
tive mood is true if and only if B is true at the world in which A is true
and which is otherwise most similar to ours.
To deal with impossible antecedents, Stalnaker posits an impossible
world in which everything is true, and which is further away from ours
16 This includes the work by Omori and myself that I have mentioned in foot-
note 7, which in fact was the starting point for the line of thought that lead me to
the present paper.
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than every possible world. It is important to note that the selection
function will only pick out this impossible world in cases where the an-
tecedent is impossible. In other words, for every possible statement,
Stalnaker’s models have at least one world in which this statement is
true. In a sense, this is a way of restricting the semantics to intended
models in the way I mentioned in the last section.17
As every statement is true in the impossible world, the non-humble
versions of Aristotle, Boethius, Unsat1 and Unsat2 all fail in this
system, counterexamples for all four being cases in which A is impossible.
However, if we restrict our attention to possible antecedents, then
things look very different, indeed. Let us start by seeing whether the
plain version of the conditions is fulfilled (I will leave off the “plain”
modifier in the next three paragraphs).
As the worlds (except for the impossible world that is furthest re-
moved from all other worlds) are all classical, in no world we find both
A and ¬A true. That means that A → ¬A cannot be true, as the
truth condition looks for the closest world in which A is true, which is
by assumption not the trivial but a classical one. So ¬A is false there,
showing that Humble Unsat1 is met. As A → ¬A is false for all pos-
sible statements A, ¬(A → ¬A) is true for all these statements, giving
us Humble Aristotle.
For Humble Unsat2, consider a true conditional (A → B) with a
possible antecedent A. Then B is true at the closest world in which A
is true, which is a classical world. So ¬B cannot be true, and therefore
(A → ¬B) can’t, either.
Last, for Humble Boethius, consider a satisfiable conditional (A →
B) with a satisfiable antecedent A. That means that there is a possible
classical world y which is closest to ours and in which (A → B) is true.
That in turn means that there is a possible classical world z which is
closest to y, given that A holds in it, in which B is true, as well. But that
means that ¬B is false in z, which means that (A → ¬B) is false in y, and
¬(A → ¬B) true. That, finally, means that (A → B) → ¬(A → ¬B)
must be true at our world.
17 One of the referees has raised an interesting question at this point, namely
whether Stalnaker’s semantics should be seen as “intelligible and well-motivated”, as
I have put it earlier in this piece. I would say that it is, even if, of course, one might
disagree with the ideas that stand behind the choice of the formalism. But at least
these ideas are straightforwardly recognizable, such as the idea that everything would
be true if something impossible were true.
Humble Connexivity 527
So, Stalnaker’s system is the first example of a well known logic in
which the plain version of humility holds. Luckily, it is also an instance in
which the modal version of our requirements is readily available, showing
that the two sets of requirements do not always diverge.
Stalnaker himself defines possibility as ¬(A → ¬A), which makes
Modal Humble Aristotle completely trivial, at least from a formal
point of view. The other clauses are slightly more interesting, but also
clearly satisfied.
8. Humble Connexivity and Paraconsistency
We saw in the last sections that the notions of satisfiability and possi-
bility (at least as expressed in modal logic) do not necessarily coincide.
The same is true of the notions of unsatisfiability and inconsistency, if
we are willing to consider paraconsistent logics.
Paraconsistency is often (though not universally) achieved by allow-
ing a glutty truth value, call it B, that is to be understood roughly as
“both true and false”. This value is considered a designated value, and
the negation of a statement with value B is fixed such that it also receives
value B, so as to give a counter example to A ∧ ¬A  B.18
Motivations for adding such a glutty value vary, and it is hard to
speak in full generality here. However, it stands to reason that, at least
in some cases, statements with value B are exactly the ones we are try-
ing to filter out in our humble requirements, their satisfiability notwith-
standing. Where paraconsistency is employed to underwrite dialetheic
theories, for example, this seems to be the case.
In other cases, such as the told-truth interpretation of the values in
First Degree Entailment (FDE), on the other hand, it does not seem
to me to be a plausible requirement to restrict the connexive principles
to antecedents that do not take value B: Suppose that an otherwise
unremarkable statement A has, by different sources, been told to us to
be true and to be false. That in itself, should not be enough to allow it
to feature in true statements such as A → ¬A. After all, surely neither
of our sources told us that “If A is the case, not A is the case” is true,
and I don’t see an intuitive story about how their information combines
to support that conditional.
18 Again, this is surely not the only way to achieve paraconsistency, but it is the
way paradigmatic examples, such as LP and FDE, work.
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For those examples in which we decide value B in the antecedent
signals an exception for our requirements, there is another thought to be
explored: Consider a statement B which is true (in some sense) while
its negation, ¬B, is also true. Shouldn’t we then also expect that there
might be some true conditionals of the form (A → B) and (A → ¬B)?
It seems so, and thus we need to also restrict our conditions to exclude
these kinds of cases.
With exceptions for both the antecedent and the succedent, the con-
ditions become, unavoidably, somewhat gnarly. Here is my suggestion:
Glutty Humble Aristotle: For any satisfiable A that does not take
value B, ¬(A → ¬A) takes a designated value.19
Glutty Humble Boethius: For any satisfiable A that does not take
value B and any satisfiable (A → B) that does not take value B and
any B that does not take value B, (A → B) → ¬(A → ¬B) takes a
designated value.
Glutty Humble Unsat1: In no model, A → ¬A is satisfiable (for any
satisfiable A that does not take value B).
Glutty Humble Unsat2: In no model, (A → B) and (A → ¬B) are
simultaneously satisfiable (for any satisfiable A that does not take
value B and any B that does not take value B).
By pushing parts of the requirements to the object language, we can
gain generality (covering also strategies for achieving paraconsistency
that do not employ gluts), as well as some meta-language clarity (albeit
on pain of more complicated object language expressions):
Paraconsistent Humble Aristotle: For any satisfiable A, (A∧¬A)
∨ ¬(A → ¬A) is valid.20
Paraconsistent Humble Boethius: For any satisfiable A and satis-
fiable (A → B), (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ ((A → B) ∧ ¬(A → B)) ∨ (A → B) →
¬(A → ¬B) is valid.
Paraconsistent Humble Unsat1: A → ¬A is satisfiable only in val-
uations in which A ∧ ¬A is also satisfied.
19 Should the paraconsistent logic in question allow us to satisfy every formula
whatsoever, this part of the clause can of course be omitted.
20 To phrase these requirements analogously to the way I have done in the clauses
for Modal Humble Connexivtiy, such as ¬(A∧¬A)  ¬(¬A → A), does not quite work,
as many paraconsistent logics will make ¬(A∧¬A) true even if (A∧¬A) is true, as well.
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Paraconsistent Humble Unsat2: (A → B) and (A → ¬B) are si-
multaneously satisfiable only in valuations in which A∧¬A is satisfied
or (A → B) ∧ (¬A → B) is satisfied.
As I said above, at least for some applications of paraconsistency,
this seems to be a natural development. However, I must admit that so
far, I have not found any example of a logic that meets these specific
requirements (I will talk about paraconsistent humble connexivity for
the rest of the section, even though all that is said also applies to glutty
humble connnexivity).
This is surprising, at least it was to me. I mentioned above that
every weakly connexive logic must be paraconsistent. It might thus
well be expected that we could find some examples among the weakly
connexive logics that have been proposed so far in which the violations
of the Unsat-clauses originate only in glutty antecedents. Those would
then pass muster under the new requirements. But, as far as I can see,
this is not the usual pattern.
Consider Heinrich Wansing’s C ([16]), a constructive connexive logic
that can be given a Kripke semantics in the vein of the Kripke semantics
for intuitionistic logic. A model for C is a structure 〈W,≤, v〉, W being a
non-empty set of partially ordered (≤) worlds and v a valuation relation,
relating formulas to values 1 and 0. Gaps and gluts of these two values
are allowed.
There are hereditary constraints for both 1 and 0:
• For all p and all worlds w and w′, if w ≤ w′ and w 1 p, then w
′ 1 p,
and
• for all p and all worlds w and w′, if w ≤ w′ and w 0 p, then w
′ 0 p.
Consequence is defined as preservation of value 1:
Γ  A iff in every model and every w ∈ W , if w 1 B for any B ∈ Γ,
then w 1 A.
Here are the clauses for the connectives:
w 1 A ∧B iff w 1 A and w 1 B
w 0 A ∧B iff w 0 A or w 0 B
w 1 A ∨B iff w 1 A or w 1 B
w 0 A ∨B iff w 0 A and w 0 B
w 1 −A iff w 0 A
w 0 −A iff w 1 A
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w 1 A ⊃ B iff for all x ≥ w, x 11 A or x 1 B
w 0 A ⊃ B iff for all x ≥ w, x 11 A or x 0 B
Now, consider a model with just one world in which A takes value 0, but
not 1. A → ¬A takes value 1 in this model, showing that Paraconsis-
tent Humble Unsat1 is not fulfilled here.
The same is true of Cantwell’s system, which I also discussed as
another example for a weakly connexive logic in [3]. It is a three valued
logic which, adjusting notation, can be seen as Graham Priest’s Logic
of Paradox (LP) with an added conditional. Here is the matrix for the
conditional:
→ T B F
T T B F
B T B F
F B B B
Here, if a statement A takes value F, Paraconsistent Humble Un-
satisfiability 1 is violated.
A close relative of this logic that shows the same pattern (i.e., that
is a weakly connexive logic the fate of which does not improve under the
new conditions) adds the following conditional to LP:
→ T B F
T T B F
B B B B
F B B B
This is not too unnatural a conditional,21 even though I don’t think
21 It might also not strike you as too natural, either. Viewing it from the angle of
the general procedure outlined in [10], it would appear as a combination of the truth
condition of a material conditional and the falsity condition of a conjunction, maybe
not the most intriguing combination.
It looks pretty plausible, however, if we take the third truth value to be a (desig-
nated) truth value gap rather than a glut:
→ T N F
T T N F
N N N N
F N N N
I have argued that gaps should be treated as designated values in certain circumstances
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I have seen it in the literature. However, it is likewise weakly connexive
while it does not satisfy the clauses of paraconsistent humble connexivity.
That these sorts of systems fail to be paraconsistently humbly con-
nexive shows something interesting about the dialectics around strong
connexivity. I mentioned earlier, when I introduced the Unsat-clauses,
that a paraconsistent logician might want to dig in her heels and reject
them. Maybe a statement A that serves as a counterexample to Explo-
sion should indeed be expected to satisfy A → ¬A and the like. Fair
enough, but in the logics that fail to be paraconsistently humbly connex-
ive, these statements are now seen not to be the culprits, at least not the
only ones. And proponents of logics that do satisfy paraconsistent hum-
ble connexivity will have no pressing need to dig in their heels, provided
they manage to find such a system. At least to my mind, adherence
to the requirements of paraconsistent humble connexivity speaks more
strongly in favor of a logic than mere simple connexivity does (although
I admit that that recommendation is less elegantly phrased).
As to the prospects of finding such a logic, the fact that I did not find
any examples of a logic satisfying these requirements, of course, does not
mean much. A perfectly satisfying system might well be achievable.
Similarly, the point of the preceding two sections was merely to give
examples that show that humble connexivity is achievable at all. It was
not meant as an endorsement of (variably) strict conditionals over other
accounts, nor do I want to suggest that other ways of giving semantics for
conditionals couldn’t be humbly connexive. It is just that so far, I have
not found any such examples. Let me now return from these concrete
examples to a more general discussion.
9. What (Humble) Connexivity is About
The refocusing of the humble clauses gives us, I have argued, a more re-
fined and philosophically better motivated set of conditions. In addition,
I believe that it also give us a better idea what connexivity is about, and
what not.
in [4]. I did not consider this logic there, but it might be seen as a simple alternative
to the logics I proposed.
After finishing the manuscript, I have become aware that Paul Egré, Lorenzo
Rossi, and Jan Sprenger, as well as Luis Estrada-González and Elisángela Ramírez-
Cámara are drafting papers discussing this logic, with the latter explicitly thinking
of the middle value as a designated gap.
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It has, for example, little to do with any particular account of nega-
tion. This thought is in mild22 disagreement with Graham Priest, who
took connexive logic to be precisely about negation, namely about an
account of negation that he called “negation as cancellation” (see [11]).
The idea is that an assertion of A is cancelled out by an assertion of
¬A, such that nothing at all is said after the two assertions have been
made. The reason Priest sees a connection here is that this account
of negation is the only one he can think of that might plausibly deal
with the instances of Aristotle and Boethius that go beyond humble
connextivity, i.e. those which have inconsistent antecedents.
Technically speaking, Priest develops an account that looks similar to
the one presented here: There is a restriction to possible antecedents, or
rather, as he is more focused on the entailment version of the connexive
theses, to possible premisses. However, it is not the requirements that are
restricted in this way, but rather the entailment relation: Inconsistent
premises do not entail anything. This leads to a very unusual notion of
entailment, on top of an account of negation that is also quite unusual.23
In contrast, as we have decided not to pay too much attention to
the problematic cases in which antecedents (or premises) are inconsis-
tent, we are free to call for humble connexivity, no matter our favorite
account of negation. Indeed, I can’t see how any of the usual stories
about negation could be in conflict with the plausibility of the humble
connexive principles.
If I were asked which logical item humble connexivity is about, I
would hesitate to answer. Rather than one isolated notion, humble con-
nexivity seems to me to be about the interplay between negation and
the conditional.24 But if I were pressed to choose only one, I would
say that humble connexivity has its most interesting things to say about
conditionals.25
22 “Mild” because he might agree with me if he were to consider humble connex-
ivity instead of unrestricted connexivity and simply claim that I changed the subject
of the discussion.
23 I should note that Priest’s piece is exploratory, and that he does not in fact
commit to either connexive logic or negation as cancellation. The point he is trying
to make is just that the two ideas belong together.
24 This feeling is in agreement with the presentation in [17].
25 A referee has encouraged me to comment on Richard Routley’s thought that
connexivity is essentially about conjunction, in particular, about the failure of con-
junction elimination (see [12] and [13]). To me, this seems a relatively absurd notion.
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If what I have argued here is right, then not every conditional state-
ment will be affected by the humble connexive requirements. In par-
ticular, counter-possible or counter-logical conditionals (e.g., “If I had
squared the circle, you would have been surprised”) will receive the same
treatment whether or not we accept humble connexivity. Furthermore, I
have a hunch that it might be even more particularized than that, namely
that the connexive theses should only apply to counterfactual condition-
als,26 and that the plausibility of the corresponding indicative instances
can be explained by appeals to pragmatics rather than semantics. I have
hinted at this thought already in footnote 9 and I am looking forward to
develop it further later, but I will not try to unfold that argument here.
10. Conclusion
I have argued that the original definition of connexivity (i.e., satisfying
Aristotle and Boethius) is both too undemanding and too demand-
ing at the same time. It is too undemanding in not calling for the unsat-
isfiability clauses of strong connexivity, and it is too demanding in not
making the restrictions to possible antecedents that humble connexivity
makes.
Regarding the latter, here is what I now think I should have said to
David Makinson six years ago:
Indeed, A → ¬A might be a fine statement if A is contradictory. I
give you that without a fight. But what about all the cases in which
A is consistent? Even then, classical logic gives you a fifty per cent
chance of A → ¬A being true. And in the remaining half of the cases,
¬A → Awill be true. That is the scandal the connexive critique should
focus on.
Of course, as I have stated in the beginning of this piece, if we want to stretch the
logical budget to afford us connexivity, we have to make spending cuts elsewhere;
one of the areas we might wish to apply these cuts to is conjunction, as Routley has
showed. But to say that this is essential to connexivity is like saying that reductions
of spendings on public housing are somehow essential to governmental environmental
protection policies. A much more detailed, but likewise critical discussion of Routley’s
idea is in [19].
26 That Stalnaker’s conditional logic is arguably the clearest example for humble
connexivity I could present in this paper is in pleasant harmony with this thought,
though of course it is not saying too much.
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The way to express that indignation is to call for the requirements
of humble connexivity.
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A. Appendix
In this appendix, I want to briefly point out the above-mentioned differ-
ence between Stalnaker’s system and the one developed by David Lewis
(see [7]) and its effect on the humble connexive principles. Where Stal-
naker posits a selection function, Lewis is more liberal. For him, there
might be more than one closest world, and there might be none. It
is the second case which generates trouble, so I will ignore the first in
what follows. If there is no closest possible world in which an antecedent
statement holds, then, in Lewis’s semantics, the counterfactual condi-
tional comes out true.
The cases in which there is no closest possible world in which the
antecedent holds include, but are not exhausted by, the cases in which
Stalnaker’s function would point to the impossible world. That is, if
the antecedent is impossible, for Lewis there is no world which is most
similar to ours in which it holds, while for Stalnaker there is one, namely
the impossible one.
So far, so good; the problem lies with the other cases in which for
Lewis there is no closest possible world in which the antecedent holds.
536 Andreas Kapsner
These are exemplified by statements like “If I were more than seven feet
tall, I would be a great basketball player.” Plausibly, Lewis holds that
there could not be one single world in which I was more than seven feet
tall but which would otherwise be maximally similar to this world. For,
whatever my exact height in this world might be, there is a height that
is incrementally closer to seven feet, and thus closer to my actual height.
And that means that there is a world in which I have that height that is
slightly closer to seven feet, and that that world is closer to the actual
world.
But of course, it is perfectly possible that I might have been more
than seven feet tall, and the statement “I am more than seven feet tall”
should certainly be satisfiable on any decent account. Nonetheless, the
statement “If I were more than seven feet tall, then I would not be more
than seven feet tall” will come out true in Lewis’s semantics. This shows
that we are not dealing with a system that is humbly connexive, for the
antecedent should certainly not be filtered out, and the last statement
was a violation of Unsat1. It also, of course, shows that there is some-
thing intuitively wrong with Lewis’s system, as has been noted by many
others before. The intuitions that are violated by his account are the
very same intuitions that stand behind the idea of humble connexivity.27
There is a variation proposed by Lewis himself that will remedy this
situation (see [7, p. 25]). He suggests that we might ask of a true counter-
factual that there should be at least one most similar antecedent-world.
Now “If I were more than seven feet tall, then I would not be more than
seven feet tall” would be false; indeed, this move would give us a system
that is humbly connexive.28
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27 That is to say, the fact that the truth of “If I were more than seven feet tall,
then I would not be more than seven feet tall” is generally seen to speak against
Lewis’s system can be read as evidence for the intuitive correctness of Unsat1.
28 In the larger scheme of things, however, this remedy appears to be only par-
tially satisfying: It would mean that statements like “If I were more than seven feet
tall, then I would be more than six feet tall” would be counted as false, which seems
not to be much of an improvement over “If I were more than seven feet tall, then I
would not be more than seven feet tall” being true.
